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Moral dilemmas often concern actions that involve causing harm to others in the
attempt to prevent greater harm. But not all actions of this kind are equal in terms
of their moral evaluation. In particular, a harm-causing preventive action is typically
regarded as less acceptable if the harm is a means to achieve the goal of preventing
greater harm than if it is a foreseen but unintended side-effect of the action. Likewise,
a harm-causing preventive action is typically deemed less acceptable if it directly
produces the harm than if it merely initiates a process that brings about the harmful
consequence by its own dynamics. We report three experiments that investigated to
which degree these two variables, the instrumentality of the harm (harm as means
vs. side-effect; Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and personal force (personal vs. impersonal
dilemmas; Experiments 2 and 3) influence deontological (harm-rejection) and utilitarian
(outcome-maximization) inclinations that have been hypothesized to underly moral
judgments in harm-related moral dilemmas. To measure these moral inclinations, the
process dissociation procedure was used. The results suggest that the instrumentality
of the harm and personal force affect both inclinations, but in opposite ways.
Personal dilemmas and dilemmas characterized by harm as a means evoked higher
deontological tendencies and lower utilitarian tendencies, than impersonal dilemmas
and dilemmas where the harm was a side-effect. These distinct influences of the
two dilemma conceptualization variables went undetected if the conventional measure
of moral inclinations, the proportion of harm-accepting judgments, was analyzed.
Furthermore, although deontological and utilitarian inclinations were found to be largely
independent overall, there was some evidence that their correlation depended on the
experimental conditions.
Keywords: moral dilemmas, moral judgment, process dissociation procedure, personal force, instrumentality
of harm
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INTRODUCTION
Moral dilemmas often concern actions that involve causing harm
to others in the attempt to prevent greater harm. To illustrate,
consider the following scenario taken from Foot (1967; slightly
modified): You are a doctor almost out of stock of the drug
required to treat a patient with severe symptoms. There is only
one dose left that would suffice to cure this person; but the same
dose could also be used to cure five other patients who have the
same deadly disease at a much earlier stage. Would you split up
the dose to help the five less seriously ill patients, knowing that
the other patient will die without the medication? And would you
judge it as morally appropriate if someone else in your position
would do so?
Philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists have made
extensive use of thought experiments of this kind to understand
how people evaluate others’ behavior and choose own actions in
moral dilemmas. This research has identified several features of
moral dilemmas that influence these evaluations and decisions
(see, e.g., Christensen et al., 2014). Two of the most important
of these dilemma conceptualization variables (Christensen
and Gomila, 2012) are the instrumentality of the harm and
personal force (e.g., Cushman et al., 2006; Greene et al., 2009;
Feltz and May, 2017).
The instrumentality of the harm concerns the question
whether the harm caused is a means to, or a side-effect of the
agent’s attempt to prevent greater harm. The above example
illustrates the second case: The death of the seriously ill patient
is a foreseen but unintended side-effect of splitting the last
dose of the drug between five other patients. The majority
of respondents accept harmful actions of this kind, but reject
them if harm is a means (Foot, 1967; O’Neill and Petrinovich,
1998; Hauser et al., 2007; Waldmann and Dieterich, 2007;
Greene et al., 2009; see Feltz and May, 2017, for a review). For
example, if the only way to save the lives of five patients were
to transplant five different organs taken from another patient,
most people will object to that action, even though it involves
the same trade-off.
Personal force refers to the role of the agent’s activity in causing
harm to another person in the attempt to prevent greater harm.
This factor has given rise to a distinction between personal
and impersonal moral dilemmas. In personal moral dilemmas,
the agent initiates and executes the harm-causing action at
first hand. Again, the above example may illustrate this case:
The doctor personally withholds the medication from the first
patient to administer it to the other patients. In impersonal
moral dilemmas, in contrast, the agent sets off a process which
brings about the harmful consequences by itself (e.g., mediated
by a mechanical apparatus), without any further activity of
the agent beyond the initial impetus. To illustrate, imagine
that the drugs are administered to patients by a computer-
controlled intravenous delivery system, and that the doctor only
needs to enter a command to cause this system to redirect the
medication away from the first patient to the other five patients.
It has been found that harmful actions performed to prevent
greater harm are typically regarded as unacceptable in personal
dilemmas, but as acceptable in impersonal dilemmas (see, e.g.,
Greene et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2004; Cushman et al., 2006;
Moore et al., 2008; Greene et al., 2009; Moore et al., 2011).
Although the effects of instrumentality and personal force
on moral judgments and decisions are well-established, the
intervening mental processes responsible for these effects are as
yet not fully understood. In particular, it is as yet not known how,
precisely, the effects of instrumentality and personal force relate
to two conflicting motivational tendencies that are generally
thought to be evoked by moral dilemmas of the described type:
The tendency to avoid causing harm to others, and the tendency
to maximize the overall benefit for oneself and others. As noted
by several authors (e.g., Greene, 2007; Waldmann and Dieterich,
2007), these two action tendencies are in line with what is
declared to be the correct behavior in dilemma situations by,
respectively, the deontological, and utilitarian schools of moral
philosophy (see also Greene, 2007, 2014; Conway et al., 2018a).
According to deontologists, the moral appropriateness of an
action depends solely on the type of action it is, independent
of the circumstances and hence, regardless of its consequences
in a specific situation (e.g., killing another person is always
morally inappropriate). In contrast, according to utilitarianists,
the morally appropriate action is always the action that, in a
given situation, maximizes the benefit to others and oneself.
Conway and Gawronski (2013) therefore call the two described
action tendencies deontological and utilitarian inclinations, and
judgments that agree with these inclinations, deontological and
utiliarian judgments. We follow this terminology in the present
article, but note that this is not meant to imply that these
inclinations are based on a person’s explicit commitment to a
deontological vs. utilitarian moral philosophy; this may, but need
not be the case (see Conway et al., 2018a).
If one accepts that evaluative judgments and decisions in
moral dilemmas are proximately caused by deontological and
utilitarian inclinations, then instrumentality and personal force
should influence these judgments and decisions by affecting one
or both of these inclinations. What is presently still unclear is the
exact nature of this influence: Are the effects of instrumentality
and personal force on moral evaluations and choices mediated
by changes in harm-rejection tendencies, benefit-maximization
tendencies, or both? The main goal of the present research is to
clarify this question.
To derive predictions about the effects of instrumentality
and personal force on deontological and utilitarian inclinations
in moral dilemmas, we consulted theories about the processes
that underlie these motivational tendencies. One of the most
prominent theories is the dual-process model of moral judgment
first proposed by Greene et al. (2001), and further elaborated
by Greene (2007, 2014; Greene et al., 2009). This theory
assumes that judgments and choices in moral dilemmas
depend on two processes: A largely automatic and fast
affective process, and a more deliberative, slower reasoning
process. More precisely, Greene et al. (2001) proposed that
contemplating certain kinds of harmful actions (in particular,
harmful actions in personal dilemmas) automatically triggers
negative affect, which evokes an action tendency to reject the
harmful action. This tendency then causes deontological moral
judgments and actions.
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But moral dilemmas can also trigger a reasoning process,
in which the person considers the possible consequences of
the different action alternatives available to her, evaluates them,
and integrates the evaluations into an overall judgment or
decision. This deliberative process is assumed to typically lead to
utilitarian judgments and actions (Greene, 2007, 2014; see also
Conway et al., 2018a).
Greene’s (2007) theory has inspired numerous empirical
studies (e.g., Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008, 2009; Mendez
et al., 2005; Cushman et al., 2006; Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Hauser
et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007; Waldmann and Dieterich,
2007; Moore et al., 2008; Conway and Gawronski, 2013; Conway
et al., 2018a; see Greene, 2014, for a review). These studies have
provided considerable evidence in support of the dual-process
theory. Nevertheless, recent research suggests that the processes
underlying judgment and decision making in moral dilemma
situations may be more complex than assumed in Greene’s (2007)
original model (see also Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013). In
particular, there is now evidence which suggests that affective
processes influence not only deontological, but also utilitarian
judgments (Reynolds and Conway, 2018; see also Cushman et al.,
2010; Baron et al., 2018), and likewise, that deliberative processes
influence not just utilitarian but also deontological judgments
(Gamez-Djokic and Molden, 2016; Byrd and Conway, 2019).
In light of these findings, less rigid versions of the dual-process
model have been proposed (e.g., Skitka and Conway, 2019).
These “softer” versions of the dual-process model abandon the
assumption of the original theory that there are exclusive links
between affect and deontological inclinations, and deliberation
and utilitarian inclinations, as well as the assumption, also made
in the original theory, that the affective process always occurs
first. However, the newer versions of the dual-process theory
still uphold the assumption that deontological inclinations are
primarily based on aversive feelings evoked by contemplating
harmful actions, whereas utilitarian inclinations are primarily
based on deliberations about outcome maximization (see also
Cushman, 2013; Conway et al., 2018a). This “softened” version
of the dual-process model served as the theoretical basis of the
present studies.
What do the dual-process model and the associated research
predict about the effects of instrumentality and personal force
on deontological and utilitarian inclinations? Findings of Greene
et al. (2001, 2004, 2009) suggest that high instrumentality
(harm as a means) and high personal force (i.e., personal
dilemmas) both cause negative affect about the contemplated
action, whereas low instrumentality (harm as a side-effect) and
low personal force (i.e., impersonal dilemmas) do not evoke
strong emotions. In addition, findings by Greene et al. 2001,
2004 suggest that impersonal dilemmas are more likely to
evoke deliberative processes than personal dilemmas. Based on
these findings, we predicted that the instrumentality of the
harm influences deontological but not utilitarian inclinations,
whereas personal force influences deontological and utilitarian
inclinations in opposite ways.
To test these hypotheses, which are further elaborated below,
a method is needed that allows the separate quantification of
deontological and utilitarian inclinations in moral dilemmas.
The conventionally used measure of moral inclinations, the
percentage of utilitarian responses (i.e., responses that approve of
the harmful action), is not suited for this purpose, as it reflects
the joint influence of both tendencies on a single dimension.
Therefore, we resorted to a different measurement approach first
used to study moral dilemmas by Conway and Gawronski (2013):
the process dissociation procedure (PD).
THE PROCESS DISSOCIATION
APPROACH TO MORAL JUDGMENT
The process dissociation procedure (PD) was originally
developed in memory research (Jacoby, 1991), but has proven
to be useful for examining the interplay of different cognitive
processes in many other research areas (see Payne and Bishara,
2009), including several areas of judgment and decision
making (e.g., Payne, 2001; Ferreira et al., 2006; Conway and
Gawronski, 2013). The goal of the PD procedure is to provide
quantitative estimates of the relative contributions of two
(or more) hypothesized mental processes to a behavior or
judgment of interest. The basic idea behind PD is to learn
about these cognitive processes by comparing situations in
which the outcomes of the processes are aligned (i.e., favor
the same response) to situations in which they are in conflict
(favor different responses). To achieve this goal, two (or more)
different versions of the experimental materials must be designed
that conform with the procedure’s requirement of comparing
congruent conditions (aligned processes) to incongruent
conditions (conflicting processes).
Conway and Gawronski (2013) were the first to apply the
PD procedure to moral judgments in dilemma situations. As
in the studies reported in the present article, their aim was to
disentangle the contributions of deontological and utilitarian
inclinations to moral judgments, and to study how experimental
manipulations known to affect moral judgments affect the two
kinds of inclinations. Following the logic of the PD procedure,
Conway and Gawronski (2013) presented participants with a
set of moral dilemmas in which deontological and utilitarian
inclinations either favored the same action (congruent scenarios)
or different actions (incongruent scenarios). For example, the
incongruent version of the “car accident” dilemma used by
Conway and Gawronski (2013, p. 231) was as follows:
You are driving through a busy city street when all of a sudden a
young mother carrying a child trips and falls into the path of your
vehicle. You are going too fast to break in time; your only hope
is to swerve out of the way. Unfortunately, the only place you can
swerve is currently occupied by a little old lady. If you swerve to
avoid the young mother and baby, you will seriously injure or kill
the old lady. Is it appropriate to swerve and hit the old lady in
order to avoid the young mother and child?
In this situation, the tendency to reject causing harm
regardless of outcomes (deontological inclination) suggests to
morally condemn swerving, even though not swerving will
cause even greater harm (the serious injury or death of the
mother and her child). In contrast, the tendency to maximize
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FIGURE 1 | Processing tree for congruent and incongruent trials. U = PD Utilitarianism parameter, D = PD Deontology parameter. For congruent dilemmas, this
process model implies that p(harm unacceptable) = U + (1–U) × D, and for incongruent dilemmas, that p(harm unacceptable) = (1–U) × D. These equations can be
solved for U and D, yielding U = p(harm unacceptable | congruent) – p(harm unacceptable | incongruent), and D = p(harm unacceptable | incongruent) / (1-U).
Hence, the parameters can be algebraically determined. Figure reprinted from Conway et al. (2018a), with permission from Elsevier.
the overall benefit (utilitarian inclination) suggests to approve of
swerving, as this action, while harming the old lady, will save the
mother and her child.
In contrast, in the congruent version of the car accident
scenario, the participants were informed that the only available
place for swerving was occupied by a group of children.
Under these circumstances, swerving to avoid injuring the
young mother and her child is not only rejected by the
person’s deontological inclination (the harm-rejection tendency),
but also by her utilitarian inclination (outcome-maximization
tendency), because not swerving now also produces the
greatest overall benefit. Figure 1 shows the hypothesized
cognitive processes and resulting judgments for congruent and
incongruent moral dilemmas.
The participants of Conway and Gawronski’s (2013)
experiments were presented with ten incongruent and ten
matched congruent moral dilemmas. The responses given
to these scenarios allowed to estimate, for each participant,
the probability of accepting vs. not accepting the harmful
action in the congruent and incongruent dilemmas. Based on
these data and the processing tree shown in Figure 1, two
parameters were estimated for each person, one representing
the person’s deontological inclination (D) and the other her
utilitarian inclination (U; see the caption to Figure 1 and
Conway et al., 2018a, for the details of the parameter estimation
procedure). These parameters were used as dependent variables
in subsequent analyses, designed to find out how they were
influenced by experimental manipulations and how D and U
correlated with each other and with covariates of interest.
Conway and Gawronski (2013) found that experimental
manipulations of cognitive load and empathic concern had
selective effects on the two PD parameters: Cognitive load
reduced the participants’ utilitarian inclinations, but left their
deontological inclinations unaffected. In contrast, induced
empathic concern increased deontological inclinations but had
no effect on utilitarian inclinations. Furthermore, the two PD
parameters were found to be only weakly correlated across
participants in one study (r = 0.28), and not significantly
correlated in two other studies, supporting the assumption that
the processes underlying D and U are largely independent. A later
meta-analysis of the PD parameter correlations obtained in 40
moral judgment studies corroborated this conclusion (meta-
analytic r = 0.10; Friesdorf et al., 2015).
Following Conway and Gawronski’s (2013) article, the PD
procedure has been used in numerous other experiments to
clarify the effects of diverse variables on deontological and
utilitarian inclinations in moral dilemmas. Like the original
study, several of these studies obtained evidence for the
importance of affective processes in moral dilemmas. For
example, Lee and Gino (2015) found that the instruction to
suppress one’s emotional reactions to moral dilemmas decreased
deontological but not utilitarian inclinations; and Reynolds and
Conway (2018) found that (a) manipulating the aversiveness
of the harmful action increased deontological inclinations but
decreased utilitarian inclinations, whereas (b) manipulating the
aversiveness of the outcome increased both inclinations (see also
Christov-Moore et al., 2017, for a related brain-imaging study).
Other PD work has helped to clarify how moral judgments are
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influenced by social considerations (Rom and Conway, 2018),
feelings of power (Fleischmann et al., 2019), self-awareness
(Reynolds et al., 2019), distrust (Conway et al., 2018b), analytical
thinking style (Li et al., 2018), gender (Friesdorf et al., 2015;
Armstrong et al., 2019), and the presentation of moral dilemmas
in a foreign language (Hayakawa et al., 2017; Muda et al., 2018).
Apart from demonstrating that the PD procedure can
detect patterns of deontological and utilitarian inclinations that
remained invisible in earlier moral dilemma research, which
relied on a one-dimensional measure of moral inclinations
(the percentage of utilitarian responses), the PD studies have
provided evidence that the U parameter indeed measures, at
least primarily, the person’s tendency to maximize the overall
benefit (e.g., Conway and Gawronski, 2013; Conway et al.,
2018a; see also Patil et al., 2020). By contrast, the interpretation
of the D parameter is somewhat less clear. Although, as
mentioned, there is evidence supporting the assumption that
the D parameter reflects affective aversions to harmful actions
(e.g., Conway and Gawronski, 2013; Lee and Gino, 2015), other
evidence suggests that the D parameter can also reflect the
person’s explicit consideration of deontological moral principles
(Gamez-Djokic and Molden, 2016). For this reason, the two
PD parameters cannot be interpreted as precisely reflecting the
processes assumed to underlie these inclinations in the original
dual-process model (Greene et al., 2001) or its more recent
variants. Rather, the two parameters seem to reflect the joint
effect of several different processes that coalesce into the two
conflicting motivational tendencies that proximately underlie
judgment and decision making in moral dilemmas. Still, we agree
with Conway et al.’s (2018a, p. 244) conclusion that “although
other processes not modeled [in the PD procedure] may play a
role, ultimately deontological responses seem to reflect relatively
more affective processing centered on harmful actions, whereas
utilitarian responses appear to reflect relatively more deliberative
reasoning centered on outcomes.”
PRESENT RESEARCH
As mentioned, the effects of instrumentality and personal
force on moral judgments in dilemma situations are well
supported; however, so far it is not entirely clear whether these
factors influence primarily deontological inclinations, utilitarian
inclinations, or both to a similar degree. To illustrate the
possibilities, consider again the car accident scenario described
above, and compare the personal version of this scenario (hit the
old lady directly) to the impersonal version (hit a scaffold which
by collapsing kills the lady). Based on previous research (e.g.,
Conway and Gawronski, 2013), one can predict that swerving
will be considered more appropriate in the impersonal scenario.
But why? There are at least three different combinations of
deontological and utilitarian inclinations that predict this pattern
of judgments. First, the personal scenario could elicit a stronger
deontological inclination than the impersonal scenario, which
then results in a higher rate of harm-rejecting responses. Second,
the impersonal scenario could evoke a stronger utilitarian
inclination than the personal scenario, which results in higher
rates of harm-approval. Third, both inclinations could be
simultaneously affected by personal force in the described
way, and the moral judgments reflect the joint effect of these
counteracting forces. Analogous possibilities exist with regard to
the effects of the instrumentality of the harm on moral judgments.
To clarify the relative importance of deontological and
utilitarian inclinations for the effects of instrumentality and
personal force on moral judgment, three experiments were
conducted. Experiment 1 examined the effect of instrumentality
of the harm (harm as means vs. harm as side-effect) on
deontological and utilitarian inclinations. Experiment 2 added
personal force (personal vs. impersonal moral dilemmas) as a
second important dilemma conceptualization variable. Again,
the aim was to clarify to which degree this factor influences
deontological and utilitarian inclinations. In addition, this
experiment allowed us to re-examine the effects of the interaction
of the two variables (as found in earlier work, see Greene
et al., 2009). Experiment 3 was a pre-registered replication of
Experiment 2 that was conducted to enhance the confidence
in the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 by replicating their
results with a much larger sample. The present research can
be considered as a “far conceptual replication” of the study
by Greene et al. (2009) in the sense of LeBel et al. (2018):
It manipulated the same variables, but used a different set of
moral dilemmas, and focused on different dependent variables
(the PD parameters).
Before proceeding, it should be noted that in our experiments,
the PD parameters were derived from the participants’ answers
to the question whether they themselves would perform the
harm-causing action. Following Christensen et al. (2014) and
others (e.g., Koenigs et al., 2007; Bartels, 2008), we focused on
moral choice since this is ultimately what matters most in moral
dilemmas (see also Foot, 1967; Waldmann and Dieterich, 2007).
However, in many moral dilemma studies, the participants were
instead asked to judge the moral appropriateness of the harmful
action, either from the first-person perspective (“Is it appropriate
for you to do X?” e.g., Conway and Gawronski, 2013), or from
the third-person perspective (“Is it morally acceptable for Joe
to do X?” e.g., Greene et al., 2009). As pointed out by several
researchers, these different dependent variables cannot simply be
regarded as equivalent (e.g., Tassy et al., 2013; Christensen et al.,
2014). We will return to this question in the General Discussion,
after presenting our results obtained for moral choice.
Hypotheses
Table 1 contains an overview of the hypotheses (as well as the
findings) of Experiments 1–3.
Concerning the dilemma conceptualization variable
instrumentality of the harm (means vs. side-effect), we
expected to replicate the typical finding of previous studies,
that harm approval rates are higher in side-effect dilemmas
than in means dilemmas. Our main interest, however, was
in the processes underlying this response pattern. To explain
the effects of instrumentality, Greene (2014) proposed an
extension of the dual-process model called the modular myopia
hypothesis, which specifies when affective processes dominate
over deliberative processes. According to this hypothesis, an
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TABLE 1 | Overview of the hypotheses tested and the results obtained in
Experiments 1, 2, and 3.
Hypothesis Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
H1a. The PD Deontology
parameter is higher when
harm is a means than when
harm is a side-effect.
Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed
H1b. The PD Utilitarianism
parameter is unaffected by
the instrumentality
manipulation.
Rejected Rejected Rejected
H2a. The PD Deontology
parameter is higher in
personal than in impersonal
dilemmas.
Not tested Confirmed Confirmed
H2b. The PD Utilitarianism
parameter is higher in
impersonal than in personal
dilemmas.
Not tested Confirmed Confirmed
H3. There is an interaction
effect of instrumentality and
personal force on
deontological inclinations,
utilitarian inclinations, or both.
Not tested Supported Not supported
H4a. The individual PD
Deontology and PD
Utilitarianism parameters are
largely independent overall,
and in particular are not
strongly negatively correlated.
Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed
H4b. The correlation between
the PD parameters differs
between experimental
conditions.
Not supported Not supported Confirmed
evolutionary “action inspector module” monitors action plans
and evokes a negative emotion whenever harm is detected as
a means to achieving a desirable end, but not if it the harm
is an unintended (even if foreseen) side-effect of the action
(Greene, 2014; see also Cushman, 2014). This hypothesis
predicts stronger deontological inclinations in moral dilemmas
depicting harm as a means than in side-effect dilemmas. In
contrast, utilitarian inclinations should not be affected by
the instrumentality manipulation, because whether the harm
is intended or is a mere side-effect is presumably irrelevant
for outcome-maximization. Based on the assumption that
deontological and utilitarian inclinations are reflected in the PD
Deontology and PD Utilitarianism parameters, respectively, we
therefore predicted (see Hypothesis H1 in Table 1), that the D
parameter would be higher for harm as means than for harm as
side-effect, whereas the U parameter would be unaffected by the
instrumentality manipulation.
With regard to the manipulation of personal force, previous
work suggests that personal dilemmas elicit stronger affective
reactions than impersonal dilemmas, whereas impersonal
dilemmas are more likely to evoke deliberative processes than
personal dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001, 2004). Based on these
findings, we predicted that the D parameter would be higher for
personal than for impersonal dilemmas, whereas the U parameter
would be higher for impersonal than for personal dilemmas
(see Table 1).
Greene et al. (2009) additionally found that the
instrumentality of the harm affected moral judgments only
in personal dilemmas, i.e., if personal force was present. Under
the assumption that moral judgments are based on deontological
and/or utilitarian inclinations, this finding suggests that a similar
interaction will be obtained for the PD parameters of one or
both of these inclinations. However, the exact nature of these
interactions was difficult to predict. Therefore, we refrained from
speculating and only predicted the existence of an interaction of
instrumentality and personal force for one or both of the two PD
parameters (Hypothesis H3, Table 1).
Finally, we formulated two hypotheses (H4a and H4b,
see Table 1) between the correlations about the two PD
parameters. H4a states that overall (i.e., across experimental
conditions), the D and U parameters would be unrelated, or
only moderately correlated. This hypothesis simply predicts the
successful replication of findings from previous experiments
using the PD procedure (see the meta-analysis of Friesdorf
et al., 2015). However, the findings of Friesdorf et al. (2015)
still allow for the possibility that the PD parameters correlate
more strongly in specific situations, not systematically considered
in the dilemmas included in their meta-analysis. Specifically, a
reflection on the nature of the experimental manipulations of
instrumentality and personal force suggested to us that these
manipulations might not only affect the relative contributions
of deontological and utilitarian inclinations to moral judgment,
but also their relation to one another. That is, we suspected
that the situational context could be a moderator of the PD
parameter correlations. This lead to the hypothesis (H4b) that
the correlation between the PD parameters would differ between
experimental conditions.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, we used the PD procedure (Conway and
Gawronski, 2013) to disentangle the effects of the instrumentality
of the harm (i.e., harm as a means vs. harm as a side-effect)
on deontological and utilitarian inclinations in moral dilemmas.
As mentioned, the instrumentality of the harm has been found
to exert a strong effect on the judgment of harmful actions in
moral dilemmas (O’Neill and Petrinovich, 1998; Hauser et al.,
2007; Greene et al., 2009; Cushman, 2014). However, it is still
unknown to which degree instrumentality affects deontological
inclinations, utilitarian inclinations, or both.
Method
Participants
A target sample size of N = 60 was determined prior to
conducting the experiment. Data collection was not continued
after reaching the target sample size. Sixty-one students (50
female) participated in exchange for course credit (Mage = 21.72,
SD = 5.04). A sensitivity power analysis for a 2 (within,
parameter type: PD Deontology vs. PD Utilitarianism) × 2
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(between, instrumentality: means vs. side-effect) repeated
measures ANOVA, conducted using G∗Power (Faul et al., 2007)
indicated a minimum detectable effect size of η2p = 0.088,
assuming α = 0.05, 1–β = 0.80, and a correlation of r = −0.45
between the repeated measures (i.e., the PD parameters),
corresponding to the actually obtained correlation in this study.
The detectable effect size corresponds to the typical effects of the
experimental manipulations used in previous moral judgment
PD studies (e.g., Conway and Gawronski, 2013, Study 2).
However, we ultimately decided to analyze the data using logistic
regression, which is more adequate for our dependent variables
(the PD parameters)1.
Materials
A set of 20 moral dilemmas, comprising ten dilemmas for
harm as means and ten for harm as side-effect, was compiled
from the literature (Cushman et al., 2006; Conway and
Gawronski, 2013; Christensen et al., 2014). In the base version
of the scenarios, the harm-rejection tendency (deontological
inclination) and the outcome-maximization tendency (utilitarian
inclination) suggested diverging responses. Following Conway
and Gawronski (2013), we constructed, for each of these
incongruent scenarios, a parallel congruent version in which
the deontological and utilitarian inclinations favored the same
response. Incongruent moral dilemmas were defined as situations
in which the overall consequences of acting (i.e., performing
a harmful action) were more beneficial than those of not
acting (Conway and Gawronski, 2013). Congruent dilemmas
were defined as situations in which the positive effects of
performing the harmful action were minimized, such that both
deontological and utilitarian inclinations suggested the rejection
of the harmful action.
Altogether, there were 40 dilemmas, 20 incongruent, and 20
congruent ones. All scenarios were matched on grammatical
structure. Instrumentality of the harm was experimentally
manipulated, whereas other dilemma conceptualization variables
that have been found to influence judgments and decisions
in previous studies (see Christensen et al., 2014) were either
held constant (personal force) or counter-balanced (benefit
recipient, evitability). The complete materials are available in the
Supplementary Material and at https://osf.io/zxykm/.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted in a computer lab of the
Institute of Psychology at the University of Greifswald. Up
to four participants were invited for group sessions. They
worked on separate computers shielded by room dividers. The
participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions
(means vs. side-effect), with each group responding to 20 moral
dilemmas, ten incongruent and ten corresponding congruent
ones. The experiment was programmed using OpenSesame
(Mathôt et al., 2012).
In each trial, one of the dilemmas was presented on the
monitor, followed by the question “Do you [action verb] so
that [consequence]?” e.g., “Do you swerve and hit the old lady
1We thank a reviewer for pointing out that logistic regression is better suited to
our data.
to avoid hitting the young mother and child?” (Christensen
et al., 2014; Present Research). The participants responded to the
moral dilemmas by clicking on one of two response buttons,
labeled “yes” and “no,” presented below the question. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of two button orders (“yes”
left and “no” right, or the reverse). To counteract sequence
and habituation effects, five different semi-random orders of the
scenarios were created for each condition. These orders were
random with two exceptions: (a) no more than three congruent
or incongruent trials occurred consecutively; (b) at least six other
dilemmas were presented between an incongruent dilemma and
its corresponding congruent version.
Results
The participants judged the harmful action as acceptable in
14% (SD = 13) of the congruent and in 55% (SD = 29)
of the incongruent dilemmas. A logit mixed-effects model
analysis (see below for more explanation) for scenario type
(congruent/incongruent) as a repeated measures factor showed
this difference to be significant, χ(1) = 73.43, p < 0.001,
OR = 9.28. The harm approval rates were similar to those found
in previous studies (Conway and Gawronski, 2013), despite the
fact that we used a different question format (first-person choice
rather than third-person evaluation).
Parameter estimates for deontological inclination (D) and
utilitarian inclination (U) were caclulated for each participant
based on equations derived from the processing tree (Figure 1;
see also Jacoby, 1991; Conway et al., 2018a). Hypotheses H1
and H4, the two hypotheses that could be tested in Experiment
1, were then evaluated using these parameters as dependent
variables. Descriptive statistics of the PD parameters obtained in
Experiments 1–3 are shown in Table 2.
In most previous moral dilemma studies that used the PD
procedure, the parameters were analyzed by means of ANOVA
after being standardized (z-transformation; e.g., Conway and
Gawronski, 2013; Lee and Gino, 2015). However, because
the parameter values, being probabilities (Jacoby, 1991), are
constrained to [0,1], their errors are not normally distributed, and
their variance depends on the mean, a logistic regression (logit)
model is better suited for their analysis (Jaeger, 2008)2. Because
parameter type was included as a within-subjects factor in the
analyses, a logit mixed-effect analysis was conducted, using the
glmer function from the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) in R
(R Core Team, 2018). The dependent variable consisted of the
weighted raw parameter scores, using 20 as the weight because
the parameters were derived from responses to 20 dilemmas.
2The z-transformation used by Conway and Gawronski (2013), being a linear
transformation, is unsuited to deal with the statistical peculiarities of probabilities
as dependent variables. Actually, Conway and Gawronski (2013, p. 235)
recommended the z-transformation for a different purpose, to make the two PD
parameters better comparable to each other, arguing that in their raw form, they
have different metrics, with the PD Utilitarianism parameter ranging between –1
and 1 and the PD Deontology parameter between 0 and 1. In fact, however, both
parameters can validly vary only between 0 and 1, as both are probabilities, and the
equations used to derive them from the data constrain both parameters to [0, 1] if
the relative judgment frequencies are error-free. The z-transformation is therefore
unnecessary. The untransformed parameters have the advantage that they have a
clear meaning (they are probabilities) and an absolute scale level. These advantages
are preserved in the logit analysis.
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TABLE 2 | Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the conventional measure of moral inclinations and the Process Dissociation (PD) parameters for
deontological inclinations (PD Deontology) and utilitarian inclinations (PD Utilitarianism) in Experiments 1–3.
Impersonal Personal
Side-effect Means Side-effect Means
Experiment 1 Conventional measure 0.71 (0.20) 0.39 (0.28)
PD Deontology (D) 0.62 (0.27) 0.80 (0.26)
PD Utilitarianism (U) 0.55 (0.20) 0.28 (0.22)
Parameter correlation −0.20 (p = 0.285) −0.48 (p = 0.007)
Experiment 2 Conventional measure 0.73 (0.24) 0.44 (0.22) 0.55 (0.29) 0.41 (0.25)
PD Deontology (D) 0.47 (0.28) 0.71 (0.22) 0.67 (0.25) 0.79 (0.22)
PD Utilitarianism (U) 0.50 (0.21) 0.23 (0.14) 0.35 (0.25) 0.28 (0.19)
Parameter correlation −0.20 (p = 0.374) −0.11 (p = 0.633) −0.06 (p = 0.789) −0.37 (p = 0.088)
Experiment 3 Conventional measure 0.78 (0.17) 0.56 (0.26) 0.66 (0.24) 0.41 (0.26)
PD Deontology (D) 0.42 (0.28) 0.56 (0.27) 0.55 (0.30) 0.76 (0.22)
PD Utilitarianism (U) 0.50 (0.24) 0.25 (0.21) 0.42 (0.25) 0.25 (0.20)
Parameter correlation −0.16 (p = 0.182) −0.24 (p = 0.041) −0.24 (p = 0.036) −0.45 (p < 0.001)
The correlations between the parameters are also shown.
TABLE 3 | Results of the logit mixed-effect model analysis for Experiment 1.
b (SE) z (p) Odds ratio (0.95 CI)
Intercept 0.79 (0.41)
Parameter (U) −0.60 (0.51) −1.17 (0.241) 0.55 (0.20,1.49)
Instrumentality
(means)
1.66** (0.61) 2.73 (0.006) 5.29 (1.60,17.46)
Parameter (U)×
Instrumentality
(means)
−3.05*** (0.75) −4.05 (< 0.001) 0.05 (0.01,0.21)
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, based on the Wald z statistic.
The independent variables were parameter type (D vs. U) and
instrumentality (means vs. side-effect), with a random intercept
for participants and a by-subject random slope for the effect of
parameter type. To be suitable for the logit analysis the dependent
variable had to be slightly conditioned as follows: First, negative
parameter values, if they occurred, were set to 0 (there were no
such values in Experiment 1, but a few occurred in Experiments
2 and 3 for the U parameter). Negative parameter estimates are
meaningless for probabilities, but can occur with errorful data.
Setting these estimates to 0 means to set them to the closest
theoretically meaningful value (see Rouder et al., 2008). Second,
to avoid fitting problems, the parameter values were rounded to
yield integer values when weighted by 20 (e.g., 0.42 was rounded
to 0.40 and 0.44 to 0.45). The significance of the fixed effects
was evaluated with likelihood ratio tests (LRT), by comparing
a model including the effect to a model without it. Because the
LRT in mixed-effects logit analyses can be unreliable for small to
moderate samples (Li and Redden, 2015), we also consulted the
Wald z-tests for the parameter estimates (see Table 3); however,
the results of the two tests were always consistent. The odds ratio
(OR) was used as the effect size index.
Consistent with H1, the two-way interaction of parameter type
and instrumentality in the mixed logit analysis was significant,
χ(1) = 14.98, p < 0.001, OR = 0.05 (see Table 2 for descriptive
statistics and Table 3 for the parameter estimates and the
associated Wald tests). This interaction was followed up by
separate logit analyses for the two parameters, using the glm
function of R. Because there was evidence for overdispersion in
the data, the quasibiomial rather than the binomial distribution
was specified in these analyses (see Crawley, 2012). The logit
analyses confirmed that, consistent with H1a, the D parameter
was significantly higher in the means (M = 0.80) condition than
in the side-effect condition (M = 0.62), χ(1) = 7.04, p = 0.008,
OR = 2.49 (see also Figure 2). Contradicting H1b, however, the
U parameter was signficantly higher in the side-effect condition
(M = 0.55) than in the means condition (M = 0.28), χ(1) = 22.62,
p < 0.001, OR = 0.32 (see Figure 2). Hence, the instrumentality
of the harm affected both the D and U parameters, and in
opposite directions.
Because Friesdorf et al. (2015) had found that female
participants have higher D scores than males, we conducted
another mixed-effects logit analysis that included sex and the
interaction of sex with parameter type as additional predictors.
No significant main effect of sex was found, χ(1) = 0.02,
p = 0.884, but there was an interaction of sex and parameter
type, χ(2) = 3.95, p = 0.047, OR = 6.34. Consistent with the
findings of Friesdorf et al. (2015), males (M = 0.61) had lower
D parameters than females (M = 0.73), χ(2) = 12.88, p < 0.001,
OR = 0.57. In addition, the U parameter was significantly higher
for males (M = 0.47) than for females (M = 0.40), χ(2) = 3.90,
p = 0.048, OR = 1.34.
To compare the results of the PD analysis to those obtained
with the conventional measure of moral inclinations, we also
analyzed the relative frequency of utilitarian judgments in
incongruent dilemmas. According to the logic underlying the
conventional measure, high scores reflect the predominance of
utilitarian and low scores the predominance of deontological
inclinations. Consistent with previous research, a logit analysis
(with weights set to 10 because the relative frequencies were based
on the responses to the 10 incongruent dilemmas only) indicated
that the proportion of utilitarian judgments was lower in the
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FIGURE 2 | Means of the PD Deontology and Utilitarianism parameters in Experiments 1-3. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
means condition (M = 0.39) than in the side-effect condition
(M = 0.71), χ(1) = 61.50, p < 0.001, OR = 0.27.
To test H4, we computed the correlations between the
participants’ PD parameters for deontological and utilitarian
inclinations. A significant negative correlation of r =−0.45,
p < 0.001, was found, contradicting the assumption that
the two parameters are completely independent. However,
still in agreement with H4a, the size of the correlation was
moderate (20% explained variance). Contradicting H4b, the
size of the correlation did not differ significantly between the
two experimental conditions (rside−effect = −0.20, p = 0.285 vs.
rmeans =−0.48, p = 0.007; z = 1.19, p = 0.235).
Discussion
Experiment 1 tested two of the four hypotheses described in
the introduction, H1 and H4. Hypothesis 1 was that the PD
Deontology parameter would be higher for harm as means than
for harm as side-effect (H1a), whereas the PD Utilitarianism
parameter would be unaffected by the instrumentality
manipulation (H1b). Whereas H1a was supported by the results,
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H1b was disconfirmed: The instrumentality manipulation
affected both deontological and utilitarian inclinations. In fact,
the effect of instrumentality on U was descriptively stronger
than its effect on D (see Figure 2): Expressed in terms of the raw
parameter scores, U decreased by 0.27 in the means condition,
relative to the side-effect condition, whereas D increased by 0.18
in the means relative to the side-effect condition.
The finding that the instrumentality manipulation affected
both deontological and utilitarian inclinations constitutes a
challenge to the modular myopia hypothesis (Greene, 2014), but
it is compatible with “soft” versions of the dual-process model
of moral judgment (e.g., Skitka and Conway, 2019), according
to which affective and deliberative processes can influence both
deontological and utilitarian inclinations.
Consistent with Friesdorf et al. (2015), females had on average
a higher D parameter than males, and we also found higher U
parameters for males than for females.
Hypothesis 4a was that the D and U parameters are
statistically largely independent overall, and in particular
are not strongly negatively related. Partly contradicting the
independence hypothesis, there was a significant negative
correlation between D and U, indicating that higher D scores
were associated with lower U scores and vice versa. Still, the
size of the overall correlation was modest (r = −0.45) and low
in one of the two experimental conditions (rside−effect = −0.20).
Hence, if judged by the size of the obtained correlations, H4a was
broadly supported. Certainly the obtained size of the negative
correlations is too low to justify the conventional measure of
moral inclinations.
Hypothesis 4b predicted significantly different correlations
of the PD parameters in the two experimental conditions. This
hypothesis was not statistically supported. However, given the
sizable differences between the correlations obtained in the
two conditions, this negative finding may have been due to
insufficient statistical power.
Analogous to some previous PD studies of moral judgment
(e.g., Reynolds and Conway, 2018), the PD procedure revealed
that a dilemma conceptualization variable can have opposite
effects on deontological and ulilitarian inclinations, a pattern
the conventional measure of moral inclinations is incapable of
detecting. This finding constitutes additional support for the PD
measurement of moral inclinations.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 had two aims. The first aim was to replicate
the unpredicted finding of Experiment 1, that the manipulation
of instrumentality affected not only deontological but also
utilitarian inclinations. The second aim was to investigate the
effects of a second important dilemma conceptualization variable,
personal force, on deontological and utilitarian inclinations.
Method
Participants
A target sample size of N = 90 was determined prior to data
collection for the initially planned ANOVA design, as being
sufficient to detect effects of the size found in Experiment 1 with
a power of 0.80 (the minimum detectable effect size for N = 90
is η2 = 0.077). For details of the power analysis, see the online
Supplementary Material to this article.
Ninety students (68 female; Mage = 23.96, SD = 6.33) at the
University of Greifswald participated in exchange for course
credit (n = 50) or a compensation of €5 (n = 40). To assure
independence of the samples of Experiments 1 and 2, students
who had already participated in Experiment 1 were not allowed
to take part in Experiment 2. Two participants were excluded
from the data analyses because they failed to comply with the
instructions (as suggested by extremely short decision times, they
responded without reading the dilemmas). Results are thus based
on a sample size of N = 88. Data collection was not continued
after reaching the target sample size.
Materials
Because personal force was an additional between-subjects factor
in Experiment 2, an impersonal dilemma version had to be
created for each of the 40 personal scenarios used in Experiment
1. This resulted in 80 scenarios. Whereas the personal dilemmas
described an actor who directly causes a harmful outcome in
the attempt to prevent greater harm, the impersonal dilemmas
described an actor who initiates a process which then, by
its own dynamics, causes the harmful outcome. For example,
in the personal version of the car accident dilemma, it was
only possible to save the mother and her child by steering
the car toward, and thereby injuring or killing, the old lady;
whereas in the impersonal version of the scenario, it was only
possible to save the mother and her child by swerving into
a scaffold that, by collapsing, will injure or kill the old lady.
All materials are available at https://osf.io/zxykm/ (see also
Supplementary Material).
Procedure
The procedure corresponded to that of Experiment 1. The only
difference was that in Experiment 2 there were four conditions,
which resulted from crossing the factors instrumentality
and personal force (personal/means, personal/side-effect,
impersonal/means, and impersonal/side-effect). Participants
were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions.
Results
The participants accepted the harmful action in 21% (SD = 17) of
the congruent and in 53% (SD = 28) of the incongruent scenarios,
χ(1) = 76.83, p< 0.001, OR = 5.28. These harm approval rates are
again very similar to those found in previous comparable studies
(Conway and Gawronski, 2013). Parameters for deontological
and utilitarian inclinations were computed for each participant
as described in the Method section of Experiment 1. Table 2
shows the PD parameter means and standard deviations (see also
Figure 2), and parameter correlations.
A logit mixed-effects model was fitted to the raw parameter
values after setting five negative parameter estimates to 0 (see
Experiment 1 for an explanation). The independent variables
were parameter type (D vs. U), instrumentality (means vs. side-
effect), and personal force (personal vs. impersonal). A random
intercept was specified for participants and a by-subject random
slope for the effect of parameter type. Parameter estimates
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TABLE 4 | Results of the logit mixed-effect model analyses for Experiments 2–3.
Experiment 2 Experiment 3
b (SE) z (p) Odds ratio (0.95 CI) b (SE) z (p) Odds ratio (0.95 CI)
Intercept −0.19 (0.33) −0.52* (0.20)
Parameter (U) 0.15 (0.46) 0.32 (0.747) 1.16 [0.47, 2.83] 0.49 (0.29) 1.73 (0.084) 1.64 [0.94, 2.87]
Instrumentality (means) 1.42** (0.48) 2.98 (0.003) 4.13 [1.63, 10.48] 0.88** (0.29) 3.07 (0.002) 2.41 [1.37, 4.22]
Personal Force (personal) 1.20* (0.47) 2.54 (0.011) 3.33 [1.31, 8.44] 0.78** (0.29) 2.75 (0.006) 2.20 [1.25, 3.84]
Parameter (U) × Instrumentality
(means)
−2.78*** (0.65) −4.28 (< 0.001) 0.06 [0.02, 0.22] −2.28*** (0.40) −5.62 (< 0.001) 0.10 [0.05, 0.23]
Parameter (U) × Personal Force
(personal)
−1.99** (0.65) −3.08 (0.002) 0.14 [0.04, 0.49] −1.22** (0.40) −3.03 (0.002) 0.30 [0.13, 0.65]
Instrumentality
(means) × Personal Force
(personal)
−0.45 (0.68) −0.67 (0.503) 0.63 [0.17, 2.40] 0.55 (0.41) 1.33 (0.183) 1.73 [0.77, 3.85]
Parameter (U) × Instrumentality
(means) × Personal Force
(personal)
1.51 (0.93) 1.63 (0.104) 4.51 [0.73, 27.64] −0.07 (0.58) −0.13 (0.898) 0.93 [0.30, 2.88]
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, based on the Wald z statistic.
and associated statistics are shown in Table 4. Separate logit
analyses were run to follow up on the obtained interactions of
instrumentality and personal force with parameter type.
In contrast to the first experiment, Experiment 2 allowed to
test all four hypotheses described in the Introduction. Concerning
the effects of instrumentality (H1), the logit mixed-effects model
revealed a significant two-way interaction of parameter type and
instrumentality, χ(1) = 21.25, p < 0.001, OR = 0.06. In line with
H1a and the findings of Experiment 1, the D parameter was
significantly higher in the means conditions (M = 0.75) than in
the side-effect conditions (M = 0.57; see Figure 2 and Table 4).
Contradicting H1b, but again replicating Experiment 1, the U
parameter was significantly higher in the side-effect conditions
(M = 0.42) than in the means conditions (M = 0.25). Separate
logit analyses for the two PD parameters with instrumentality
and personal force as the independent variables were conducted
to verify this pattern. Again the quasibinomial rather than
the binomial distribution was used in these analyses because
there was evidence for overdispersion. The results confirmed
that D was higher in the means than in side-effect conditions,
χ(1) = 9.46, p = 0.002, OR = 2.80, whereas U was lower in
the means than in the side-effect conditions, χ(1) = 19.03,
p < 0.001, OR = 0.30.
Hypothesis 2 also received support: There was a significant
two-way interaction of parameter type and personal force,
χ(1) = 6.85, p = 0.009, OR = 0.14 (see Figure 2 and Table 4).
Separate logit regressions for each parameter confirmed that, in
line with H2a, the PD Deontology parameter was significantly
higher in personal (M = 0.73) than impersonal dilemmas
(M = 0.59), χ(1) = 6.56, p = 0.010, OR = 2.32. Also as predicted
(H2b), the reverse was found for the PD Utilitarianism parameter
(M = 0.31 and M = 0.36, for U in personal and impersonal
dilemmas, respectively), χ(1) = 5.82, p = 0.016, OR = 0.53.
In addition, there was support for hypothesis H3: The separate
logit analyses for D and U detected a significant interaction of
instrumentality and personal force on U, χ(1) = 5.25, p = 0.022,
OR = 2.50. No significant interaction effect was found for D,
χ(1) = 0.62, p = 0.432. Follow-up analyses (separately for the
means and side-effect dilemmas) revealed that the predicted
effect of personal force on U (a lower U in personal than
impersonal dilemmas) occurred in the side-effect scenarios,
χ(1) = 4.79, p = 0.029, OR = 0.53, but not in the means scenarios,
χ(1) = 1.08, p = 0.298.
Again, we conducted an additional analysis that also included
included sex and the interaction of sex and parameter type as
predictors, to test for possible sex differences. No significant
main effect of sex, χ(1) = 0.63, p = 0.427, and no interaction
with parameter type was found, χ(1) = 0.79, p = 0.373.
Both parameters were nearly identical for females and males
(D: Mfemale = 0.65, Mmale = 0.69; U: Mfemale = 0.34, and
Mmale = 0.28). Analogous to Experiment 1, we also conducted an
analysis for the conventional measure of moral inclinations, the
relative frequency of utilitarian judgments. Means and standard
deviations for the conventional measure are shown in Table 2.
Consistent with the familiar pattern of rejecting the harmful
action in means and personal scenarios, but accepting it in
side-effect and impersonal scenarios, the frequency of utilitarian
judgments was highest in the impersonal/side-effect condition
and lowest in the personal/means condition (Ms = 0.73 and 0.41,
respectively). A logit analysis with instrumentality and personal
force as independent variables found significant main effects for
instrumentality, χ(1) = 41.18, p< 0.001, OR = 0.28, and personal
force, χ(1) = 11.06, p < 0.001, OR = 0.43, in the expected
direction. In addition, a significant interaction of instrumentality
and personal force was obtained, χ(1) = 6.86, p = 0.009,
OR = 2.08, indicating that high personal force reduced utilitarian
judgments in side-effect dilemmas, χ(1) = 17.58, p < 0.001,
OR = 0.43, but not in means dilemmas, χ(1) = 0.33, p = 0.563.
Hypothesis 4a was partially supported: Although, as in
Experiment 1, there was a significant negative correlation
between the PD parameters, this correlation was modest,
r =−0.29, p = 0.006, and well within the range of previously
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obtained PD parameter correlations (Friesdorf et al., 2015). The
second part of the hypothesis (H4b) was again unsupported:
Even though the PD parameter correlations differed considerably
between the experimental conditions (see Table 2), pairwise
comparisons revealed that none of these differences were
statistically significant (all zs ≤ 1.012, all ps ≥ 0.156).
EXPERIMENT 3
To enhance confidence in the findings of Experiments 1 and 2,
we conducted a third experiment with a much larger sample size.
The materials and the experimental procedure of Experiment
3 were the same as in Experiment 2, with the exception of
slight changes required by the online presentation of the study,
plus a number of improvements to the German translations
of the original English scenarios. These changes were made
to enhance the clarity of the dilemmas. For example, overly
long sentences were divided into several shorter ones, a few
words were exchanged, and the punctuation and orthography
was revisited. Furthermore, different from Experiments 1 and
2, Experiment 3 was pre-registered, i.e., all hypotheses (which
corresponded to those described in the Present Research section),
procedures, and a sampling and analysis plan were registered
prior to data collection. The pre-registration is available at https:
//osf.io/zxykm/.
Method
Participants
A target sample size of N = 300 was decided on prior to
data collection (see Supplementary Material). For the originally
planned ANOVA analysis, this sample size is sufficient to detect
an effect size of η2 = 0.023 with a power of 0.80, which is a
much smaller effect than the effects obtained in Experiments
1 and 2 and in previous comparable studies (e.g., Conway
and Gawronski, 2013). Three hundred and ten participants
were recruited for the online study at two German University
campuses. Participation in the study was compensated with
course credit or the opportunity to take part in a raffle in which
one of fifteen 50-Euro Amazon vouchers could be won. Two
participants informed us that they had mistakenly taken part in
the study twice; the duplicate entries were removed prior to the
data analyses. A preliminary analysis of total processing time
revealed ten outliers (> 3 SD below or above the mean of the
logarithmized processing time), i.e., participants who responded
either very quickly (in one case, in less than 15 s) or very
slowly (several hours). These outliers were also excluded from the
analyses3. All analyses are thus based on a sample size of N = 300
(69 males, three indicated a gender other than female or male;
Mage = 24.03 years, SD = 5.25).
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure were essentially the same as in
Experiment 2, the main difference being that the experiment was
3These exclusions were not pre-registered but are nevertheless justified to improve
the data quality. We repeated all analyses with the complete sample (i.e., without
the exclusions) and found only minute differences to the results reported here.
conducted as an online study. To this end, Experiment 2 was
re-implemented as a web experiment using SoSciSurvey,
a browser-based generator for online surveys and web
experiments (www.soscisurvey.de, Munich, Germany). The
order of presentation of the dilemmas was determined using the
same randomization procedure as in Experiments 1 and 2. Minor
changes were made to the on-screen appearance of the moral
dilemmas (e.g., bold fonts and response buttons) to support the
online presentation of the materials. All materials are available in
the online supplement to this article and at https://osf.io/zxykm/.
The complete web experiment is available on request from
the first author.
Results
The harmful action was accepted in 25% (SD = 20) of the
congruent scenarios and in 60% (SD = 27) of the incongruent
scenarios. This difference was significant, χ(1) = 295.00,
p < 0.001, OR = 5.99, and is comparable in size to that found
in Experiments 1 and 2 and in prior studies (e.g., Conway
and Gawronski, 2013). PD Parameters for deontological and
utilitarian inclinations were computed for each participant as in
Experiments 1 and 2. The means of the PD parameters (after
11 negative values of U had been set to 0) and the parameter
correlations in the different conditions are shown in Table 2, and
the means are also displayed in Figure 2.
The same analysis strategy as in Experiment 2 was used: A logit
mixed-effects regression with parameter type, instrumentality,
and personal force as independent variables, followed by separate
logit analyses for each parameter. These analyses replicated
the findings of the previous experiments. Table 4 reports the
parameter estimates obtained in the mixed-effects regression.
With regard to H1, the analysis revealed a significant
interaction of parameter type and instrumentality, χ(1) = 64.08,
p < 0.001, OR = 0.10, that was consistent with the findings of
Experiments 1 and 2. As confirmed by separate logit analyses for
each parameter, the D parameter was significantly higher in the
means conditions (M = 0.66) than in the side-effect conditions
(M = 0.49), χ(1) = 9.97, p = 0.002, OR = 1.78, whereas the
U parameter was significantly lower in the means (M = 0.25)
than in the side-effect conditions (M = 0.46), χ(1) = 42.56,
p < 0.001, OR = 0.34. (As in Experiment 2, the quasibinomial
rather than the binomial distribution was specified in these
analyses to account for overdispersion). These results corroborate
the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, and again contradict
the prediction that we derived from the modular myopia
hypothesis, that utilitarian inclinations will remain unaffected by
the manipulation of instrumentality.
Regarding the personal force manipulation (H2), there was a
significant two-way interaction of parameter type and personal
force, χ(1) = 18.86, p < 0.001, OR = 0.30 (see Table 4). Separate
logit regressions found that the D parameter was significantly
higher in personal (M = 0.65) than in impersonal dilemmas
(M = 0.49), χ(1) = 8.03, p = 0.005, OR = 1.68, which is
consistent with H2a and with the findings of Experiment 2. Also
in agreement with the findings of Experiment 2 and with H2b, the
U parameter was lower in personal (M = 0.34) than impersonal
dilemmas (M = 0.38), χ(1) = 4.47, p = 0.035, OR = 0.71.
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In contrast to Experiment 2, the separate logit analyses for
D and U found no support for an interaction of instrumentality
and personal force on either U, χ(1) = 2.00, p = 0.158, or on D,
χ(1) = 1.98, p = 0.159.
Once again, we tested for sex differences in an extended
mixed-effects analysis, but again we found no significant effects
for sex, χ(1) = 0.83, p = 0.363, nor for the interaction of sex and
parameter type, χ(1) = 2.85, p = 0.091. As in Experiment 2, both
the D and U parameters were very similar for females and males
(D: Mfemale = 0.59, Mmale = 0.52; U: Mfemale = 0.36, Mmale = 0.37).
As in Experiments 1 and 2, we also analyzed the
conventional measure of moral inclinations, the relative
frequency of utilitarian judgments. Consistent with
the findings of Experiment 2, the approval of the
harmful action was highest in the impersonal/side-effect
condition and lowest in the personal/means condition
(Ms = 0.78 vs. 0.41, see also Table 2). A logit model with
instrumentality and personal force as the independent variables
revealed main effects of instrumentality, χ(1) = 81.02,
p < 0.001, OR = 0.37, and personal force, χ(1) = 26.02,
p < 0.001, OR = 0.56, but no significant interaction,
χ(1) = 0.02, p = 0.885.
The finding of Experiments 1 and 2 of a moderate negative
overall correlation between the PD parameters (H4a) was also
replicated, r = −0.34, p < 0.001. Pairwise comparisons of
the parameter correlations obtained in the four experimental
conditions revealed that the correlation in the personal/means
condition differed significantly from that in the impersonal/side-
effect condition, z = 1.94, p = 0.026, and marginally significantly
from the correlations in the other two conditions, personal/side-
effect and impersonal/means, z = 1.43, p = 0.076, and
z = 1.45, p = 0.073, respectively. The remaining three
comparisons were not significant (all zs ≤ 0.52, all ps ≥ 0.301).
Hence, with the larger sample size afforded by Experiment
3 (N = 75 per condition), hypothesis H4b (that parameter
correlations differ between the experimental conditions) received
statistical support.
Discussion of Experiments 2 and 3
Experiments 2 and 3 replicated the main finding of the first study,
a significant and large effect of the instrumentality manipulation
on both deontological (H1a) and utilitarian inclinations (H1b).
Again, instrumentality affected both utilitarian and deontological
inclinations in opposite ways. While this finding is inconsistent
with our predictions (derived from the modular myopia
hypothesis), it is consistent with a “soft” version of the dual-
process model (Skitka and Conway, 2019), according to which
affective processes can influence both inclinations.
In line with H2, the D parameter was greater in personal than
impersonal dilemmas, whereas the U parameter was greater in
impersonal than personal dilemmas.
H3 predicted an interaction between instrumentality and
personal force on one or both PD parameters. In line with
this hypothesis, a significant interaction effect was obtained
for U in Experiment 2; however, this interaction failed to
replicate in Experiment 3. Overall, therefore, there was no
convincing support for H3.
Interestingly, Experiment 3 also failed to replicate the
significant interaction between instrumentality and personal
force for the conventional measure of moral inclinations
observed in Experiment 2. Given the much larger sample size
and the associated higher power of Experiment 3, an interaction
effect of the same size as in Experiment 2 should have shown
up if it exists. The fact that we did not find it therefore suggests
that the interaction found in Experiment 2 was a false positive.
However, the possibility remains that the failure to obtain the
interaction in Experiment 3 was due to factors associated with the
experimental setting, the different scenarios used, or the different
dependent variable (own likely action rather than a third-person
moral evaluation).
Finally, Experiments 2 and 3 provided further support for the
assumption that deontological and utilitarian inclinations are
relatively independent of each other (Conway and Gawronski,
2013; Friesdorf et al., 2015). This support consists of three
findings of our studies. First, the instrumentality of the
harm and personal force influenced both deontological
and utilitarian inclinations, but in opposite directions
and to different degrees. Second, the two PD parameters
were overall (i.e., across the experimental conditions) only
moderately correlated. If the two underlying processes were
reciprocally related, as implicitly assumed by the conventional
measure of moral inclinations, this correlation should be
much higher. Third, the correlation between the two PD
parameters was found to be significantly different between
at least two experimental conditions in Experiment 3.
In Experiments 1 and 2, differences of similar size were
obtained, suggesting that the lack of the between-condition
differences in these studies was likely due to the comparatively
small sample size.
In sum, the findings of Experiments 2 and 3 were largely
consistent with each other, and their results also agreed for
the most part with findings of Experiment 1. This enhanced
confidence in the obtained results and the main conclusions
drawn from them.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Three experiments with a combined sample size of N = 449
were conducted to investigate the effects of two moral
dilemma conceptualization variables, the instrumentality of
the harm (means vs. side-effect) and personal force (personal
vs. impersonal), on deontological and utilitarian inclinations
in harm-related moral dilemmas. The process dissociation
procedure (PD) was used to accommodate recent criticisms
of the conventionally used, one-dimensional measure of moral
inclinations (Conway and Gawronski, 2013). In agreement
with previous studies reviewed in the introduction, the
PD procedure proved to be a more sensitive measurement
instrument than the conventional measure for detecting the
contributions of deontological and utilitarian inclinations to
moral judgment. Specifically, the PD procedure, but not the
conventional measure of moral inclinations, revealed selective
effects of the manipulated dilemma conceptualization variables
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on deontological and utilitarian inclinations. These findings,
as well as the low obtained correlations between the two PD
parameters, provide further support for the assumption that
these judgment inclinations (and presumably, the underlying
mental processes) are largely independent, a central claim of
the dual-process model of moral judgment (Greene, 2007;
Conway et al., 2018a).
A summary of the hypotheses tested and the results obtained
in the present research is contained in Table 1.
The central question of our studies was to clarify whether
instrumentality and personal force, two of the most important
variables that influence judgments and choices in moral dilemma
scenarios, exert their effects by influencing deontological
inclinations, utilitarian inclinations, or both. This question
can now be answered as follows: Instrumentality and
personal force influence both inclinations, but in opposite
directions and to different degrees. Specifically, personal
dilemmas and dilemmas characterized by harm as a means
evoked higher deontological tendencies and lower utilitarian
tendencies than impersonal dilemmas and dilemmas where
the harm was a side-effect. No convincing evidence was
obtained for hypothesis H3, which predicted an interaction
effect of instrumentality and personal force on one or
both PD parameters.
In line with hypothesis H4b, Experiment 3 found that the
parameter correlations differed significantly between at least
some experimental conditions if a sufficient sample size is
used. This finding seems at first sight to be at odds with the
meta-analysis of Friesdorf et al. (2015) of the PD parameter
correlations obtained in 40 studies. Similar to our findings,
Friesdorf et al. (2015) found that the parameter correlations
varied considerably (from r = −0.31 to r = 0.36), but they were
unable to identify moderators that accounted for this variation.
In contrast, our findings suggest that the parameter correlations
depend to some degree on the combination of instrumentality
and personal force. This factor may have remained undetected
in the meta-analysis of Friesdorf et al. (2015) because most
of the included studies used the same set of dilemmas (that
introduced by Conway and Gawronski, 2013), which includes
moral dilemmas from different content domains; furthermore,
the included harm-related scenarios do not systematically differ
with regard to the levels of instrumentality and personal force.
Our studies refine the conclusions of Friesdorf et al. (2015)
by suggesting that deontological and utilitarian inclinations
are uncorrelated in impersonal situations where harm is a
side-effect, but moderately negatively correlated in personal
dilemmas where harm is a means. A possible explanation
of this finding is that the latter scenarios were experienced
as particularly conflictive and therefore motivated attempts
to justify the chosen action (predominantly, harm-rejection)
by devaluating the alternative action (outcome-maximization),
with the degree of devaluation being proportional to the
strength of the harm-rejection tendency. This devaluation
process then manifested itself as a negative correlation of
the PD parameters.
In our experiments, the PD parameters were derived from
the participants’ answers to the question whether they would
perform the harm-causing action themselves. That is, like
several previous moral dilemma studies (e.g., Bartels, 2008;
Christensen et al., 2014), our experiments focused on moral
choice. In contrast, in probably the majority of previous moral
dilemma studies, the participants were asked to judge the
moral appropriateness of the harmful action, either from a
first-person perspective (e.g., Conway and Gawronski, 2013), or
from a third-person perspective (e.g., Greene et al., 2009). Can
our findings, obtained for first-person choices, be generalized
to moral evaluations? A positive answer is suggested by the
consideration that, even though moral evaluation and choice
are in part influenced by distinct factors, they are ultimately
based on the same kinds of processes (i.e., deontological and
utilitarian inclinations). For evaluations made from the first-
person perspective at least, this assumption is supported by
our finding that the harm approval rates obtained in our
experiments were very similar to those obtained in previous
PD studies asking for judgments of appropriateness (e.g.,
Conway and Gawronski, 2013). Additional empirical support
for the assumption that choice and evaluation are closely
related comes from a study by Bostyn et al. (2018), who
found that choices in hypothetical moral dilemmas (participants
decided whether or not to divert electroshocks from a cage
with five mice to a single mouse) were predicted by moral
appropriateness judgments as measured by a traditional moral
dilemma battery. However, other studies (e.g., Tassy et al.,
2013) found that people are more approving of harmful actions
if they need to decide what to do than if they judge the
action’s appropriateness from a third-person perspective. It is
therefore well posssible that lower approval rates would have
been found in our studies if people had been asked to make
moral evaluations. However, this does not necessarily mean that
manipulations of instrumentality and personal force influence
moral choice and third-person moral evaluations in different
ways. To answer this question, future studies could directly
compare the two questions for the scenarios used in our
studies, while also varying the degree of context information (see
FeldmanHall et al., 2012).
In agreement with several previous studies (Friesdorf
et al., 2015; Conway et al., 2018a; Armstrong et al., 2019),
Experiment 1 found that the D parameter was higher for
females than males; however, this finding was not replicated
in Experiments 2 and 3, where personal force was included
as a second factor. This difference to previous findings may
have been due to the different set of moral dilemmas used.
Alternatively, or in addition, it could reflect cultural differences
(see, e.g., Graham et al., 2016) between the US samples
of prior research and our German samples. So far, cultural
variations of deontological and utilitarian inclinations have to
our knowledge not been systematically studied. It is noteworthy,
however, that in a related research area on the so-called side-
effect effect (e.g., Knobe, 2003), Lau and Reisenzein (2016)
found only a weak and strongly scenario-dependent effect
for German samples.
The PD analysis of the effects of instrumentality provided
a test of the modular myopia hypothesis, proposed by
Greene (2014) to explain why a harmful action in a moral
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dilemma is more likely to be approved of if the harm is an
unintended side-effect than if it is a means to achieve the
goal of preventing greater harm. Based on this hypothesis,
we predicted that a manipulation of the instrumentality of
the harm would influence the D parameter but not the U
parameter. In conflict with this prediction, the manipulation
of instrumentality was found to affect both deontological and
utilitarian inclinations. It should be noted, however, that our
test of the modular myopia hypothesis has some limitations.
Among others, the moral dilemmas used in our studies
varied the personal force factor within two distinct sets of
means and side-effect dilemmas. Varying both instrumentality
and personal force within the same moral dilemma (Greene
et al., 2009) would provide a stronger test of the modular
myopia hypothesis.
Although instrumentality and personal force are among
the most important determinants of moral judgments and
choices (e.g., Christensen et al., 2014; Feltz and May, 2017),
several additional dilemma conceptualization variables have
been identified. For instance, Rosas and Koenigs (2014)
found that self-interest (i.e., whether the agent in a moral
dilemma is the victim or beneficiary of the harm-causing
action) is another important feature of moral dilemmas
that influences judgment and choice (see also Christensen
et al., 2014). The dilemmas used in our studies were
(roughly) counterbalanced within conditions with regard
to self-interest, and thus the effects of this variable were
controlled. However, in future PD studies, self-interest
should be systematically varied to test whether it interacts
with instrumentality and personal force. The same should
be done for other important dilemma conceptualization
variables, that have so far not been investigated with the
PD procedure, such as the (in-) evitability of the harm
resulting from the proposed action (see e.g., Christensen
and Gomila, 2012). Finally, our research did not consider
individual differences that affect judgments and actions in
moral dilemmas, such as the tendency to prefer inaction over
action. For a recent suggestion how the general preference
for inaction and other individual difference variables
can be taken into account, see Gawronski et al. (2017),
and Körner et al. (2020).
CONCLUSION
Three experiments used the process dissociation procedure
to examine the effects of the instrumentality of the harm
(means vs. side-effect) and personal force (personal vs.
impersonal) on deontological and utilitarian inclinations in
harm-related moral dilemmas. The results indicated that
instrumentality and personal force affect both deontological
and utilitarian inclinations, but in opposite directions
and to different degrees. Taken together, our findings
are consistent with a “soft” version of the dual-process
theory of moral judgments, according to which affective
and deliberative processes affect both deontological and
utilitarian inclinations.
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